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Advocacy, True Threats, and the
First Amendment
by MARK STRASSER*
Introduction
Brandenburg v. Ohio' is thought by many to represent an
extremely speech protective doctrine.2 Yet, much of the protection
offered by Brandenburg can easily be swallowed up by the true threat
doctrine, which provides the basis for a robust exception to First
Amendment protections. Both the Brandenburg protections and the
true threat exception are important to maintain-the great challenge
for the Court is to include both within the formulation and
articulation of First Amendment jurisprudence so that sufficient
protection is afforded to the implicated societal and individual
interests represented by each. Regrettably, rather than provide
helpful guidelines that would establish the contours of Brandenburg
and the true threat exception, the Court has instead focused on highly
contested exceptions within First Amendment jurisprudence, leaving
lower courts to fend for themselves. The current jurisprudence is
hopelessly confused, and courts are reaching radically different
results in relevantly similar cases. Unless and until the Court changes
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
2. See, e.g., Jamin B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism: The Triumph and
Unrealized Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (2009)
(discussing "the 'outside' speech principle of Brandenburg v. Ohio, which protects all
speech in the street (or elsewhere in society outside of specific institutional contexts), that
is not likely (or intended) to 'incit[e] . . . imminent lawless action."'). See also S. Elizabeth
Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy:
Getting beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2000) ("Although the
Brandenburg test properly protects political speech advocating the overthrow of the
government or other abstract promotion of lawlessness, it has proven to be overprotective
of nonpolitical speech that directly facilitates physical harm against others.").
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its approach to help clarify matters, one can only expect the great
disparity in reasoning and result in this area to increase.
Part I of this article describes the evolving constitutional
jurisprudence, noting that the Court has missed several opportunities
to clarify the relevant jurisprudence and instead has chosen to muddy
it further. Part II describes some of the debates in the lower courts,
focusing on how the outcome of these debates would often not have
much effect as a practical matter. Ironically, some of the more
significant and difficult issues are simply being ignored, making it all
the more difficult to make any headway in articulating a consistent
jurisprudence that takes adequate account of the competing interests
at play. The article concludes that unless the Court addresses the
current inconsistencies in the jurisprudence, the interests both in
security and in having robust political debate will continue to be
sacrificed.
I. Advocacy and True Threat Jurisprudence
The current chaotic state of the Brandenburg and true threat
jurisprudence can be attributed to several causes, not least of which is
that members of the Court sometimes compartmentalize speech too
readily and too absolutely, apparently failing to appreciate that in
many instances speech characterized as advocacy might also be
characterized as threatening. The Court's failure to acknowledge that
speech might reasonably be taken either way forces lower courts to
make guesses about whether the Court would characterize particular
speech as one rather than the other and also what protections, if any,
are afforded by the First Amendment for speech that might
reasonably be characterized as both advocating and threatening.
Until the Court explains which threatening speech is nonetheless
protected, no headway will be made in clarifying the jurisprudence.
A. Brandenburg v. Ohio
Brandenburg announced that the "constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action."' This very speech-
protective holding arose in the context of a prosecution of Clarence
3. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
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Brandenburg under Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Statute for
advocating terrorism as a means of accomplishing political reform.4
Brandenburg was a Ku Klux Klan leader' who had invited a TV
reporter to attend a rally,' where the events were filmed and later
broadcasted. The film included "scattered phrases ... that were
derogatory of Negroes and, in one instance of Jews."' It also included
the following language: "We're not a revengent organization, but if
our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have
to be some revengence [sic] taken."9
The Court examined the Ohio statute at issue, "which, by its own
words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to
forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely
to advocate the described type of action."'o The statute could not
pass constitutional muster," although the Court did not make clear
whether the statute was being applied to the derogatory language
involving Jews and Blacks or, instead, was being applied to the
language suggesting possible "revengence" against members of the
different federal branches. The Court's lack of clarity was likely due,
at least in part, to the unhelpfulness of the opinions below.12
Someone who suggests that "revengence" may be necessary need
not be suggesting that the law will or even should be broken. Such a
person might instead be suggesting that unless policies are changed,
the voters will manifest their displeasure in the voting booth. Indeed,
a person threatening voter retaliation might, in addition, suggest that
there will be a march on Washington D.C. 3 without thereby
advocating anything illegal. Thus, if the Court was focusing on what
4. See id. at 444-45.
5. See id. at 444.
6. Id. at 445.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 446.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 449.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 445 ("[T]he intermediate appellate court of Ohio affirmed his conviction
without opinion. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal, sua sponte, 'for the
reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.' It did not file an opinion
or explain its conclusions.").
13. See id. at 446 ("We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred
thousand strong.").
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was said in the films with respect to the "revengence" that might be
taken against members of the federal government, it is not surprising
that the Court quoted what it had already said in Noto v. United
Statesl4 that the "'mere abstract teaching. . . of the moral propriety or
even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence is not the same
as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such
action."" While the "revengence" language might have been
suggesting some sort of violence, it might also have been suggesting
that legal means would be utilized to achieve the speaker's desired
results.
Other language in the film was more ominous, e.g., "Send the
Jews back to Israel" and "Let's give them back to the dark garden."16
More ominous still was "Bury the niggers."" These would seem to be
suggesting illegal actions-killing American citizens or forcing them
to leave the country. Perhaps the Court believed this kind of
advocacy merely abstract or insufficiently imminent. Or, perhaps, the
Court was not focusing on these statements but, instead, solely on
those discussing "revengence.".
At least two further points might be made about the film in
Brandenburg. First, one might understand the comments against
Jews and Blacks as not involving mere advocacy about what others
should do but, instead, as an announcement about what the speaker
and his colleagues plan to do. In that event, the language is more
appropriately characterized as threatening rather than as (mere)
advocacy. Second, the Court briefly mentioned in passing that the
film included a cross burning.19 The Court did not say whether the
segment including the cross burning was broadcast, instead merely
noting that some portions of the film were on TV, without specifying
14. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
15. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448 (quoting Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-98).
16. Id. at 446 n.1.
17. Id.
18. See Seth D. Berlin, Are The Nuremberg Files and 'Wanted' Posters Protected
Advocacy or Unprotected Threat? 20 COMM. LAW. 1, 28 ("In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that speech advocating violence-there, a Ku Klux Klan
member's statement 'there might have to be some revengence taken'-was
constitutionally protected unless it was directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless
action.").
19. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445 ("They were gathered around a large wooden
cross, which they burned.").
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which parts had been seen by a local or national audience. Yet, if
indeed the cross burning was televised, some viewers would not
merely see the film as political advocacy, however repugnant, but
instead or in addition as something terrifying."
Regrettably, the Court did not focus on the terrifying aspect of
the film at issue in Brandenburg, and thus it is difficult to know
whether the Brandenburg doctrine only covers speech involving
advocacy or covers other speech as well. Thus, it is difficult to say
whether Brandenburg should be read as protecting speech involving
political advocacy even when that speech also involves elements that
might reasonably be viewed as threatening or if, instead,
Brandenburg should only be read as limited to speech involving
advocacy.22 The fact that the speech at issue in Brandenburg could
have been characterized in another way may simply have been
ignored by the Court, so it is simply impossible to say whether
Brandenburg has implications for threatening or terrorizing speech.
B. True Threat Analysis
Ironically, the Court had recently articulated some aspects of its
threatening language jurisprudence, having decided a case dealing
with an alleged threat against President Lyndon B. Johnson only a
few months before Brandenburg was handed down.23 Watts v. United
States involved an individual who had been convicted of "knowingly
and willfully threatening the President." 24 Robert Watts was an 18-
year-old who had received a 1-A draft classification and had been
told to report for his physical. 25 After saying that he was not going to
20. See id. ("Portions of the films were later broadcast on the local station and on a
national network.").
21. Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From
the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 773,
999 (2008) ("The televised broadcast of a blazing cross and hooded armed Klansmen
making thinly-veiled threats surely would unnerve if not terrify at least some Ohio
viewers, a state with a long Klan history.").
22. Cf Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993 (2002) (statement of Justice Stevens
respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari, discussing "a most important
issue concerning the scope of our holding in Brandenburg, for our opinion expressly
encompassed nothing more than 'mere advocacy"') (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
449).
23. Brandenburg v. Ohio was handed down on June 9, 1969. Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705 (1969), was handed down on April 21, 1969.
24. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706.
25. Id.
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go,26 he further suggested, "'If they ever make me carry a rifle the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.,"' because "'[t]hey are not
going to make me kill my black brothers."'2
When reviewing the conviction, D.C. Circuit Court judges
disagreed about whether the statute under which Watts was convicted
required that he have a particular intent. The Watts majority
construed the statute as prohibiting "the knowing and willful act of
threatening the life of the President,"' explaining that "it is the threat
which must be 'knowingly and willfully' made" 29-the statute's intent
requirement did not require an "intent to execute the content of the
threat."'o Rejecting the defense that Watts had merely been making a
jest," the court held that "[a]ppellant's words, considered in context,
reasonably permit an inference that he was uttering a threat."3 2
In dissent, Judge Skelly Wright worried that a conviction might
be based on offensive language "which was meant as jest, as rhetoric,
or as hyperbole."33 He argued that the statute required "a willful
expression of an intent to carry out a threat against the Executive."34
Two issues should not be conflated: (1) Did the person intend to
make the threat?, and (2) Did the person intend to carry out the
threat?
Someone who says something in jest does not intend to make or
carry out a threat. Someone who makes an empty threat wants the
listener to perceive a threat, even though the person making the
threat has no intention of carrying out the threat. Arguably, the jest
is not a threat at all, whereas the empty threat is a threat, albeit one
that will not be effectuated.
One of the issues dividing the judges on the D.C. Circuit was
whether Congress had intended to criminalize making a jest about
harming the president. A different but related issue was whether the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 705
(1969).
29. Id. at 680.
30. Id.
31. Id. ("Nor is it a defense that the words were intended merely as a jest.").
32. Id. at 681.
33. Id. at 689 (Wright, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 687 (Wright, J., dissenting) (quoting 53 CONG. REC. 9378 (1916), where
Congressman Webb, the bill's chief spokesperson, explained the requirement).
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes
limitations on what Congress can criminalize, i.e., whether it is within
Congress's power to criminalize making such a jest.
The Watts Court explained that it was important to distinguish
between a threat on the one hand and protected speech on the
other," noting the disagreement among the judges on the D.C. Circuit
with respect to whether the statute at issue included a requirement
that the speaker "have intended to carry out his 'threat."'3  While
refusing to construe the statute, the Supreme Court expressed "grave
doubts" that the court below had interpreted the statute correctly.37
Instead of specifically stating the basis for these grave doubts, the
Court referred generally to Judge Skelly Wright's dissent."
Although taking no position on what the willfulness requirement
entailed, 9 the Court adopted part" of Wright's position by pointing
out that the "statute initially requires the Government to prove a true
'threat."' 41 Noting that Watts's statement was made during a political
debate,42 the threat was conditioned on an event that Watts had said
would never take place, and that Watts and his audience had laughed
after the statement had been made,43 the Court found that the
Government had not met its burden of establishing that a true threat
had been made.' The Court concluded that the petitioner's "only
offense here was 'a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a
political opposition to the President,"' 45 suggesting that the statement
35. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 ("What is a threat must be distinguished from what is
constitutionally protected speech.").
36. Id. at 707.
37. See id. at 708.
38. See id. (citing Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d at 686-93 (Wright, J., dissenting)).
39. See id. ("whatever the 'willfullness' requirement implies").
40. Judge Wright wrote: "a conviction under Section 871 can be sustained if (1) the
defendant made the alleged threat with specific intent to execute it, and (2) in the context
and circumstances the statement unambiguously constituted a threat upon the life or
safety of the President " See Watts, 402 F.2d at 691 (Wright, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court nowhere implied that it interpreted the statute to require a specific intent to execute
the threat, assuming that executing a threat means carrying it out.
41. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
42. Id. at 707.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 708 ("We agree with petitioner.").
45. Id.
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by Watts could not be interpreted otherwise," D.C. Circuit
interpretation to the contrary notwithstanding.
Six years later, the Court reversed the conviction of George
Rogers for having made threats against the life of President Richard
Nixon.47 Rogers, a 34-year-old alcoholic, had wandered into a coffee
shop early one morning, behaving in a "loud and obstreperous
manner."' Among other things, he had claimed to be Jesus Christ,49
and had announced his opposition to Nixon's going to China
"because the Chinese had a bomb that only he [Rogers] knew about,
which might be used against the people of this country."o Rogers
also announced that he "was going to go to Washington to 'whip
Nixon's ass,' or to 'kill him to save the United States."'.
The police were called.52 When discussing his plan to attack the
President with the police, Rogers said that he was going to walk to
Washington, D.C. from Shreveport, Louisiana, because he did not
like cars, providing yet further reason to believe that his statements
were not credible. Rogers was not charged with any crimes under
state law.' However, when the police reported to a local Secret
Service agent what Rogers had said, the agent had petitioner arrested
on federal charges."
The Rogers majority reversed the conviction and remanded the
case because of what the judge had told the jury. Apparently, after
almost two hours of deliberation," the jury foreman had asked the
judge whether he would "accept the Verdict-'Guilty as charged with
extreme mercy of the Court.""' The judge responded in the
affirmative." Five minutes later, the jury came back with a verdict of
46. Id.
47. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 36 (1975) ("the conviction must be
reversed").
48. See id. at 41 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 41-42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
52. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
56. See id.at36.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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"guilty with extreme mercy." 9 The United States Supreme Court
reasoned that the jury's reaching a verdict five minutes after the judge
had manifested a willingness to accept the extreme mercy
recommendation "strongly suggests that the trial judge's response
may have induced unanimity by giving members of the jury who had
previously hesitated about reaching a guilty verdict the impression
that the recommendation might be an acceptable compromise.""
Justice Marshall urged in his Rogers concurrence that the
conviction be reversed on substantive grounds. He argued that the
prevailing standard, whose validity had been cast into doubt in Watts,
"would support the conviction of anyone making a statement that
would reasonably be understood as a threat, as long as the defendant
intended to make the statement and knew the meaning of the words
used." 61
The test to determine whether the requisite intent was present
was described in the following way:
The jury was instructed in effect that it was not required to find
that the petitioner actually intended to kill or injure the
President, or even that he made a statement that he thought
might be taken as a serious threat. Instead, the jury was
permitted to convict on a showing merely that a reasonable man
in petitioner's place would have foreseen that the statements he
made would be understood as indicating a serious intention to
commit the act.62
Justice Marshall argued that the objective construction test was too
broad. After noting that "threats may be costly and dangerous to
society in a variety of ways, even when their authors have no
intention whatever of carrying them out,"' Justice Marshall
nonetheless suggested that the relevant standard should require
"proof that the defendant intended to make a threatening statement,
and that the statement he made was in fact threatening in nature." 65
59. Id. at 40.
60. Id. (citing United States v. Glick, 463 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 1972)).
61. Id. at 43 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877
(9th Cir. 1969); Ragansky v. United States, 253 F. 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1918)).
62. Id. at 43-44 (Marshall, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 44 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 46-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Such a standard would be less forgiving than the objective
construction standard, under which a "defendant is subject to
prosecution for any statement that might reasonably be interpreted as
a threat, regardless of the speaker's intention."" Basically, Justice
Marshall argued that the objective construction standard in effect
"embodies a negligence standard, charging the defendant with
responsibility for the effect of his statements on his listeners."67
A requirement that the speaker intends that his statement be
taken as a threat itself requires further elaboration. One
interpretation would be that the speaker's subjective intent would
have to be established-proof that the speaker wanted her comments
to be construed as a threat would be required. Justice Marshall did
not go that far. Although an analysis of "the circumstances under
which the statement was made"a would be necessary, he neither
stated nor implied that the only relevant circumstances would be
those establishing the speaker's subjective state of mind. For
example, "if a call were made to the White House threatening an
attempt on the President's life within an hour,... the caller might
well be subject to punishment under the statute." 69 Justice Marshall
did not suggest that it would be necessary to prove that the speaker
was conscious of the likelihood that others would interpret her
statement as a threat, although he cautioned that permitting the "jury
to convict on no more than a showing that a reasonably prudent man
would expect his hearers to take his threat seriously is to impose an
unduly stringent standard in this sensitive area.""
A few points might be made about the exchange between the
Rogers majority and concurrence. First, the Court did not adopt
Justice Marshall's view, although it also did not offer any reasons to
reject it. One cannot tell whether the Court disagreed substantively
with the position offered by Justice Marshall or whether, instead, the
majority simply saw no reason to reach the substantive issues, given
the procedural error that had occurred.
Second, the "threat" made by George Rogers seemed no more
credible or "true" than the threat made by Robert Watts, although
for different reasons. The statement by Rogers seemed to be political
66. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
67. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
69. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
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hyperbole, while the statements by Watts seemed to be the ravings of
someone who had had too much to drink. If, for example, the Secret
Service could only maintain surveillance on one of these individuals,
e.g., because of limited resources, it simply is not clear who would be
thought the more serious risk. But if that is so, then it is not clear that
either statement could meet the objective reasonableness test used to
show that a threat had actually been made.
Third, while Justice Marshall's test may be more protective of
speech than the objective test he criticizes, even his test might result
in a finding that someone had made a threat when in fact the
individual had only been saying something in jest. Justice Marshall's
standard raises the bar so that an individual who had negligently
failed to perceive how her statement might be understood would not
be found to have made an actionable threat. However, his test, which
incorporates consideration of the circumstances in which a statement
had been offered, leaves room for a jury to find that a threat had been
made when a person had recklessly failed to perceive how her
statement might be understood.
C. Threats versus Advocacy
Ironically, two of the cases most closely associated with
Brandenburg," Hess v. Indiana7 2 and NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co.," involved language that might reasonably have been construed
either as advocacy or as threats. Gregory Hess was convicted of
having engaged in disorderly conduct74 when he had said either "We'll
take the fucking street later"" or "We'll take the fucking street
again"" during a demonstration. There was testimony that he
did not appear to be exhorting the crowd to go back into the
street, that he was facing the crowd and not the street when he
uttered the statement, that his statement did not appear to be
addressed to any particular person or group, and that his tone,
71. Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655,
667 (2009) ("Aside from Hess, the Court has applied Brandenburg in only one other
case .. . NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.").
72. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
73. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
74. Hess, 414 U.S. at 105 ("Gregory Hess appeals from his conviction in the Indiana
courts for violating the State's disorderly conduct statute.").
75. Id. at 107.
76. Id.
349
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
although loud, was no louder than that of the other people in
the area.
Testimony to the contrary notwithstanding, the trial court found that
Hess was attempting to incite lawless action, but the United States
Supreme Court suggested that the state could not meet the high
standard set in Brandenburg. Indeed, the Court questioned whether
the statement could be read as inciting illegal behavior at all, since it
"could be taken as counsel for present moderation."' Even were the
statement interpreted to be more ominous, it "at worst ... amounted
to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite
future time."79
In his dissent, then Justice Rehnquist argued that Hess's
language might be interpreted differently and that "there are surely
possible constructions of the statement which would encompass more
or less immediate and continuing action against the harassed police.""'
He was joined by Chief Justice Burger, who had written the majority
opinion in Watts when he was on the D.C. Circuit bench.
No one on the Court expressly considered whether the language
could be considered a threat, presumably because the trial court had
characterized Hess's language as incitement. The difficulty pointed to
here is that it is simply unclear whether the Court would have held
Hess's speech protected had the language been characterized as a
possible threat. For example, neither Watts nor Rogers suggests that
imminence is one of the criteria to be considered when assessing
whether a threat was constitutionally protected.82 Yet, the lack of
imminence in Hess's advocacy was what made it protected speech
under Brandenburg." If indeed a different result might have been
77. Id.
78. Id. at 108.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. See Jay, supra note 21, at 1009 (noting that that D.C. Circuit Court opinion was
written by "Judge (and soon to be Chief Justice) Warren E. Burger, who thought that
Watt's 'words, considered in context, reasonably permit an inference that he was uttering
a threat').
82. Watts involved something that would never occur, because Watts was not going to
the physical. See text accompanying note 26, supra. Rogers did not involve anything
imminent, since the alleged threat could only be effectuated after Rogers had walked from
Louisiana to Washington D.C. See text accompanying note 53, supra.
83. See text accompanying note 80, supra.
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reached, had the trial court deemed Hess's language both threatening
and inciting, then the Brandenburg test is likely far less protective
than is sometimes thought.'
The suggestion that Hess might have been decided differently if
the language had been characterized as a threat rather than as
advocacy might seem to be contradicted by Claiborne Hardware,
which arguably subjected threatening language to the Brandenburg
test.5  Claiborne Hardware involved a suit by seventeen white
merchants who sought damages against two corporations and 146
individuals resulting from an economic boycott.' All but eighteen of
the original defendants were found jointly and severally liable for
over 1.25 million dollars.' In addition, petitioners were enjoined
from:
[S]tationing "store watchers" at the respondents' business
premises; from "persuading" any person to withhold his
patronage from respondents; from "using demeaning and
obscene language to or about any person" because that person
continued to patronize the respondents; from "picketing or
patrolling" the premises of any of the respondents; and from
using violence against any person or inflicting damage to any
real or personal property.
The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the judgment of damages, 9
although the court dismissed the counts against certain defendants."
The court held the boycott unlawful, reasoning that "[i]f any of these
factors-force, violence, or threats-is present, then the boycott is
84. Cf. Berlin, supra note 18, at 29 (discussing "the exacting standards of
Brandenburg and Hess v. Indiana").
85. Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and Free
Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1331 (2005) ("The unmistakable message of
Claiborne Hardware seems to be that at least in the context of threatening language with
political overtones, a 'true threat' is defined by the three elements of the Brandenburg
test: the words must be explicit, the words must be spoken in a context in which serious
harm is imminent, and the speaker must possess the specific intent that the harm occur.").
86. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 889-90.
87. Id. at 893.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 894.
90. See id. at 896.
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illegal regardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical,
political, social or other."
Charles Evers in particular had been found liable, based on his
allegedly threatening language. For example, he had "stated that
boycott violators would be 'disciplined' by their own people and had
warned that the Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at
night,"' and also had been found to have stated, "If we catch any of
you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn
neck."93
One of the points at issue was what the "discipline" mentioned
by Evers would involve. The Claiborne Hardware Court explained:
One form of "discipline" of black persons who violated the
boycott appears to have been employed witlr some regularity.
Individuals stood outside of boycotted stores and identified
those who traded with the merchants. Some of these "store
watchers" were members of a group known as the "Black Hats"
or the "Deacons." The names of persons who violated the
boycott were read at meetings of the Claiborne County
NAACP and published in a mimeographed paper entitled the
"Black Times." As stated by the chancellor, those persons
"were branded as traitors to the black cause, called demeaninf
names, and socially ostracized for merely trading with whites."9
The Court admitted that more violent forms of discipline were also
used. For example, shots were fired at a house, a brick was thrown
through a windshield, and a flower garden was damaged.95 Other
incidents included the confiscation of a bottle of liquor from a black
man who had purchased it at a white-owned store9 6 and a fight
between four men and a commercial fisherman not honoring the
boycott.' In addition, a group of young Blacks had pulled down the
91. See id. at 895 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 393 So.2d 1290, 1301 (Miss.
1980)).
92. Id. at 902.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 903-04.
95. Id. at 904.
96. Id. at 905.
97. Id.
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overalls of an elderly man and spanked him because he had not
observed the boycott."
The Claiborne Hardware Court noted that there had been no
finding that any of these incidents had occurred after 1966," which
made it difficult to tie these incidents to the losses incurred years
later." The Court also noted that the boycott had been furthered by
protected speech.
Nonparticipants repeatedly were urged to join the common
cause, both through public address and through personal
solicitation. These elements of the boycott involve speech in its
most direct form. In addition, names of boycott violators were
read aloud at meetings at the First Baptist Church and
published in a local black newspaper. Petitioners admittedly
sought to persuade others to join the boycott through social
pressure and the "threat" of social ostracism.'ox
The Court then explained, "Speech does not lose its protected
character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or coerce
them into action."1m
Clearly, some of the activity at issue in the case was
constitutionally protected, although that fact did not "end the
relevant constitutional inquiry."'o3 For example, secondary boycotts
could be prohibited." Nonetheless, the Court held that the state did
not have the power "to prohibit peaceful political activity such as that
found in the boycott in this case,"'os and that "the nonviolent elements
of petitioners' activities are entitled to the protection of the First
Amendment."6
That nonviolent activities were protected did not immunize
everything that had been done, because the "First Amendment does
98. Id.
99. Id. at 906.
100. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text (describing the kind of nexus that
had to be established between the losses sustained and the alleged causes).
101. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 909-10.
102. Id. at 910.
103. Id. at 912.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 913.
106. Id. at 915.
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not protect violence."" The state could impose liability for business
losses attributable to violence or to threats of violence,'? although the
Court cautioned that when "such conduct occurs in the context of
constitutionally protected activity, . . . 'precision of regulation' is
demanded."'a Basically, only "those losses proximately caused by
unlawful conduct may be recovered.',"o
It was clear that some business losses resulted from protected
activity,"' and establishing which losses were attributable to the
unprotected activity was no easy task. Such a task was made even
more difficult considering that language advocating violence against
those not complying with the boycott was protected unless it fell
outside of Brandenburg protections. Evers's speech was viewed as
protected advocacy rather than as unprotected threats, 2 and thus
business losses attributable to his speech were not recoverable.
Because the Court characterized Evers's speeches as advocacy" and
because the Court found no other evidence of Evers having made
threats,"4 no liability could be imposed for his having made the
statements at issue."'
Yet, this means that Claiborne Hardware should not be
understood as having applied the Brandenburg factors to threats"'
but, instead, as having skirted that issue by characterizing Evers's
speeches as advocacy rather than as threats."' Regrettably, the
Claiborne Hardware Court did not indicate how, in an unclear case, a
107. Id. at 916.
108. Id. (suggesting that no "federal rule of law restricts a State from imposing tort
liability for business losses that are caused by violence and by threats of violence").
109. Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
110. Id. at 918.
111. Id. at 921 ("The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court itself demonstrates that
all business losses were not proximately caused by the violence and threats of violence
found to be present.").
112. Id. at 928 ("The emotionally charged rhetoric of Charles Evers' speeches did not
transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg.").
113. See id.
114. See id. at 929 ("[T]here is no evidence-apart from the speeches themselves-that
Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts of violence.").
115. Id. at 929 ("The findings are constitutionally inadequate to support the damages
judgment against him.").
116. For this suggestion, see Gey, supra note 85, at 1331.
117. See id. (noting that "the Supreme Court persists in its refusal to confront the 'true
threats' dilemma directly").
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court should go about deciding whether to construe particular
language as advocacy or, instead, as a threat.
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,"'8 the Court continued its almost
willful refusal to provide help to lower courts wishing to distinguish
between advocacy and threats. The case was based on the following
set of events:
In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner and several
other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by
taping together broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned
the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived
across the street from the house where petitioner was staying.11 9
The closest that the Court came to suggesting that the cross burning
at issue involved a threat was in noting in a footnote that the conduct
might have violated a Minnesota statute prohibiting "terroristic
threats."120 The focus of the Court's analysis was on the
constitutionality of St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,121
which provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not
limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.'22
The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the ordinance as only
reaching "fighting words," which were not protected by the
Constitution.123 The United States Supreme Court accepted that
construction,'124 but nonetheless struck down the ordinance as
118. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
119. Id. at 379-80.
120. See id. at 380 n.1.
121. ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
122. RAY., 505 U.S. at 380.
123. Id. at 380-81.
124. See id. at 381 ("[W]e are bound by the construction given to it by the Minnesota
court") (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328, 339 (1986)).
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unconstitutional. 25  In explaining why the ordinance did not pass
muster, the R.A. V. court noted that when it is said that although
certain kinds of speech can "be regulated because of their
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.),"l 26
those kinds of speech cannot "be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content."127
Basically, the Court was suggesting that merely because speech could
be criminalized on one basis would not make such speech immune to
constitutional guarantees. For example, while it would be permissible
to prohibit obscene speech, it would not be permissible to criminalize
only obscene speech that was critical of the government."
The R.A.V. Court offered additional explanation of the
distinction it was trying to draw, which only made matters more
confusing. "A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity
which is the most patently offensive in its prurience-i.e., that which
involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not
prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive
political messages."" 9 The Court then applied its theory to the case at
hand:
Although the phrase in the ordinance, "arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others," has been limited by the Minnesota
Supreme Court's construction to reach only those symbols or
displays that amount to "fighting words," the remaining,
unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance applies only to
"fighting words" that insult, or provoke violence, "on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Displays containing
abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are
permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified
disfavored topics. Those who wish to use "fighting words" in
connection with other ideas-to express hostility, for example, on
125. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 381 ("Assuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached
by the ordinance is proscribable under the 'fighting words' doctrine, we nonetheless
conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.").
126. Id. at 383.
127. Id. at 383-84.
128. Id. at 385 (noting that the "proposition that a particular instance of speech can be
proscribable on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but -not on the basis of another
(e.g., opposition to the city government) is commonplace").
129. Id. at 388 (citing Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1041 (1991)).
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the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality-are not covered.30
The R.A.V. majority did not seem to appreciate that this very
exception seemed to provide the basis for upholding the ordinance at
issue. Arguably, St. Paul had selected the categories at issue precisely
because these fighting words were especially likely to cause a breach
of the peace.13 ' Thus, St. Paul need not have been making a choice
regarding which political views it found most offensive but, instead,
might have been worried about which symbolic acts were greater
threats to public health and safety.132
The R.A.V. concurrence interpreted the majority to be holding
that "a narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass
constitutional muster if the object of that legislation could be
accomplished by banning a wider category of speech.""' They then
suggested that such a holding made questionable the very statute that
had been the focus of Watts and Rogers, that is a statute criminalizing
making threats against the President. After all, "because the
Government could prohibit all threats and not just those directed
against the President, under the Court's theory, the compelling
reasons justifying the enactment of special legislation to safeguard the
President would be irrelevant, and the statute would fail First
Amendment review."'34 Indeed, in a brief footnote with no
elaboration, the concurrence noted that a law criminalizing threats "is
content based in and of itself because it distinguishes between
threatening and nonthreatening speech.""' But such a way of
understanding what is content-based raises a whole host of issues
regarding the requisite narrowness of tailoring for the regulation of
threats.
130. Id. at 391.
131. Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring) ("The ordinance proscribes a subset of 'fighting
words,' those that injure 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.' This
selective regulation reflects the city's judgment that harms based on race, color, creed,
religion, or gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other
fighting words.").
132. See In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 511 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (suggesting that the "ordinance is a narrowly tailored
means toward accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the
community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and order").
133. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 404 (White, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 408 (White, J., concurring).
135. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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Both the majority and the concurrence believed the St. Paul
ordinance was unconstitutional, but disagreed about why it was. The
concurrence argued that the Minnesota Supreme Court had not
accurately captured the limitations imposed by the fighting words
exception when suggesting that the ordinance only criminalized
displays that would arouse anger, alarm, or resentment.136  As the
R.A. V. concurrence pointed out, the fighting words exception is much
narrower than that, so the Minnesota statue, even as interpreted by
that state's high court, would criminalize protected speech.'37
The R.A.V. Court implied that St. Paul was trying to criminalize
political speech based on viewpoint,"' whereas the R.A.V.
concurrence suggested that the ordinance was fatally overbroad,
because it criminalized both protected and unprotected speech.'39
Neither offered any helpful discussion of threats, even though the
family in whose yard this cross had been burned could not help but
understand that act as "an unmistakable symbol of violence and
hatred based on virulent notions of racial supremacy."
R.A. V. raised a number of questions, for example, whether the
state violates constitutional guarantees when imposing special
punishments on individuals for committing anti-social acts against
particular groups. Wisconsin v. Mitchell41 made clear that R.A. V.
does not preclude such legislation, although in so holding the Court
nonetheless managed to avoid many of the difficult questions courts
face when trying to apply First Amendment protections in cases
involving hateful or threatening speech.
At issue in Mitchell was the constitutionality of a Wisconsin
statute that enhanced the maximum penalty for an offense "whenever
136. Id. at 413-14 (White, J., concurring) (citing Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510)
("Indeed, the Minnesota court emphasized (tracking the language of the ordinance) that
'the ordinance censors only those displays that one knows or should know will create
anger, alarm or resentment based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias."').
137. Id. at 414 (White, J., concurring).
138. See id. at 391 (majority opinion) ("The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul
to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.
[] In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.").
139. Id. at 397 (White, J., concurring) ("This case could easily be decided within the
contours of established First Amendment law by holding, as petitioner argues, that the St.
Paul ordinance is fatally overbroad because it criminalizes not only unprotected
expression but expression protected by the First Amendment.").
140. Welfare of R.A. V., 464 N.W.2d at 508.
141. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
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the defendant '[i]ntentionally selects the person against whom the
crime ... is committed ... because of the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that
person. .. ."142 Todd Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery had
been increased 43 because he had selected his victim on the basis of
144
race.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the statute, because
the state would often be forced to present evidence of the defendant's
prior speech to establish the accused's invidious intent.145 Yet, as the
Mitchell Court correctly pointed out, the state often uses speech to
establish an individual's intention or motivation, and the state's doing
so can hardly always be thought a violation of the First
Amendment. 146  Nonetheless, R.A.V. at least seemed to pose an
obstacle for the enhancement statute. For example, as the Mitchell
Court acknowledged, "under the Wisconsin statute the same criminal
conduct may be more heavily punished if the victim is selected
because of his race or other protected status than if no such motive
obtained." 147 The Mitchell Court might also have pointed out that the
penalty would be greater if the victim were selected because of his
race rather than because of his union membership, which at least
seemed to violate the spirit of R.A. V.148
The Mitchell Court distinguished R.A. V. by noting that "whereas
the ordinance struck down in R.A.V. was explicitly directed at
expression (i.e., 'speech' or 'messages') . . . the statute in this case is
142. Id. at 480-81 (citing WIs. STAT. § 939.645(l)(b) (1993)).
143. Id. at 480 ("That offense ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of two years'
imprisonment. §§ 940.19(lm) and 939.50(3)(e). But because the jury found that Mitchell
had intentionally selected his victim because of the boy's race, the maximum sentence for
Mitchell's offense was increased to seven years under § 939.645.") (citing Wis. STAT. §§
940.19(1m) (1993), 939.50(3)(e) (1993) and 939.645(1)(b) (1993)).
144. See id. at 479.
145. Id. at 482 ("[I]n order to prove that a defendant intentionally selected his victim
because of the victim's protected status, the State would often have to introduce evidence
of the defendant's prior speech, such as racial epithets he may have uttered before the
commission of the offense.").
146. Id. at 489 ("The First Amendment, moreover, does not prohibit the evidentiary
use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent. Evidence
of a defendant's previous declarations or statements is commonly admitted in criminal
trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevancy, reliability, and the like.").
147. Id. at 484-85.
148. Cf R.A.V.,505 U.S. at 391.
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aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment."149 However,
this was not the most convincing way to distinguish the cases, since
cross burning is conduct that may violate a number of laws.5 o
Further, the Mitchell Court's suggestion that "the Wisconsin statute
singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this
conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm"'
was not the best way to distinguish R.A. V., since this was the
argument the R.A.V. concurrence had stated might have been put
forth by St. Paul to save its ordinance.'52
While correct in suggesting that the First Amendment does not
preclude the use of a person's statements to establish her intention or
motivation, the Mitchell Court's method of distinguishing R.A. V.
helped to highlight that R.A. V. does not have some of the robust
implications that have sometimes been suggested.' The R.A. V.
mode of analysis was further undermined in Virginia v. Black.54
Black involved two different prosecutions for cross burning. One
involved Barry Black, who had led a Ku Klux Klan rally on private
property with the owner's permission."' A sheriff who went to
observe what was occurring at the rally noticed that forty to fifty cars
passed by,"' so many people witnessed the events at issue. Rebecca
Sechrist, a relative of the property owner,' testified that she felt very
scared after hearing Klan members speak at the rally.' At the end of
the rally, a cross was burned, which made Sechrist feel "awful" and
149. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392).
150. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380 ("this conduct could have been punished under any of a
number of laws").
151. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487-88.
152. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 407 (White, J., concurring) ("The ordinance proscribes a
subset of 'fighting words,' those that injure 'on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender.' This selective regulation reflects the city's judgment that harms based on race,
color, creed, religion, or gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused
by other fighting words.").
153. Cf. Mark S. Kende, Regulating Internet Pornography Aimed at Children: A
Comparative Constitutional Perspective on Passing the Camel Through the Needle's
Eye, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, 1634 (2007) ("R.A.V. throws a monkey wrench into the
Court's neat, categorical First Amendment jurisprudence.").
154. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
155. Id. at 348.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 349.
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"terrible."15 9 Black was charged with burning a cross with the intent
to intimidate."
The other prosecution involved events that occurred on a
separate occasion" in a different place.16 Richard Elliott and
Jonathan O'Mara attempted to burn a cross in the yard of James
Jubilee, Elliott's next-door neighbor."' Apparently, Elliott and
O'Mara were retaliating against Jubilee for having complained about
shots being fired in the back of Elliott's home." When Jubilee
noticed the partially burned cross the next day, he became very
nervous about what to expect next.
The Black plurality recognized that "cross burnings have been
used to communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared
ideology,"6 6 and that the Klan often "used cross burnings as a tool of
intimidation and a threat of impending violence.""' Nonetheless, the
plurality emphasized that "cross burning sometimes carries no
intimidating message,"16 for example, burning a cross strictly for Klan
members might be "a sign of celebration and ceremony." 169 That a
cross burning can be used as an internal message of solidarity does
not undermine the fact that "at other times the intimidating message
is the only message conveyed,"7 o nor that "when a cross burning is
used to intimidate, few if any messages are more powerful.""'
Indeed, the degree to which a cross burning is seen as intimidating is
generally understood, which is why individuals not associated with the
Klan "who wish to threaten or menace another person sometimes use
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Black led the rally on August 22, 1998 whereas the other burning occurred on
May 2, 1998, see id. at 348, 350.
162. The Klan rally occurred in Cana, Virginia, whereas the other cross burning
occurred in Virginia Beach, Virginia, see id. at 348, 350.
163. Id. at 350.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 354.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 357.
169. Id. at 356.
170. Id. at 357.
171. Id.
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cross burning because of this association between a burning cross and
violence."" 2
The case at hand afforded the Black plurality an opportunity to
discuss the true threat exception in First Amendment jurisprudence.
"'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.""'
There is no requirement that a speaker intend to carry out the
threat,7 4 since the prohibition on true threats is designed to protect
individuals from the fear of violence and from the life disruption that
such threats can cause."' The Court explained that intimidation "in
the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true
threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death."' 6
Understanding that the case before it, like the case before the
R.A.V. Court, involved a cross burning prohibition, the Black
plurality tried to explain why (some of) the Virginia statute passed
muster even though the St. Paul ordinance did not:
Virginia's statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment
insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate.
Unlike the statute at issue in R.A. V., the Virginia statute does
not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward
"one of the specified disfavored topics." It does not matter
whether an individual burns a cross with intent to intimidate
because of the victim's race, gender, or religion, or because of
the victim's "political affiliation, union membership, or
homosexuality.
Yet, it might be argued, given the history of cross burning as an
extreme method of racial and religious intimidation," there is no
need for the state to make explicit the reason for banning cross
burning with an intent to intimidate-the state's purpose would be
172. Id.
173. Id. at 359.
174. Id. at 360.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 362 (citing R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391).
178. See id. at 354-55.
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understood by anyone aware of the statute. However, the plurality
pointed out, "[I]t is not true that cross burners direct their
intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious minorities.""
Occasionally, individuals or groups might be targeted for other
reasons,18 and so the plurality believed the Virginia statute and the St.
Paul ordinance distinguishable.
Emphasizing that "burning a cross is a particularly virulent form
of intimidation,""m the plurality explained that it was permissible for
Virginia to "choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in
light of cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of
impending violence""2 instead of prohibiting intimidating messages
more generally." Yet, this means that the prevailing jurisprudence
makes a somewhat surprising distinction. Following R.A. V., a state
cannot criminalize cross burning that intimidates "on the basis of
race, color, creed, religion or gender."m8 However, following Black, a
state can criminalize cross burning that intimidates more generally.
Further, following Mitchell, a state can enhance penalties if the
accused selects his victim on the basis of "race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that
person."186 Thus, while it is not permissible to make a separate crime
of targeting minorities through intimidating cross burning, it is
permissible to criminalize cross burning that is meant to intimidate
and also to enhance the penalty when it is done with the intent of
targeting particular classes.
The Black plurality emphasized that while the "act of burning a
cross may mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally
proscribable intimidation," it may also "mean ... that the person is
engaged in core political speech.""' Presumably, the Court was
comparing the kinds of intimidation that occurred in Virginia Beach
and St. Paul with the kind of speech that might occur at a closed Klan
179. Id. at 362.
180. See id. at 363 (discussing a lawyer and some union members who had been
targeted).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380.
185. See Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
186. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 480-81 n.1 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.645(1) (1989-1990)).
187. See Black, 538 U.S. at 365.
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rally, where no one would feel intimidated or threatened by the cross
burning.'" The plurality noted that "sometimes the cross burning is a
statement of ideology, a symbol of group solidarity. It is a ritual used
at Klan gatherings, and it is used to represent the Klan itself."'89 After
making these points, the plurality concluded that a cross burning "at a
political rally would almost certainly be protected expression,""
although failing to elaborate on why that was so.
The Virginia statute had included a provision "treating any cross
burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate." 191 Holding
that provision unconstitutional, 192 the plurality detailed some of the
defects of such a presumption, for example, noting that such a
presumption "does not distinguish between a cross burning done with
the purpose of creating anger or resentment and a cross burning done
with the purpose of threatening or intimidating a victim." 193 Thus, the
plurality was pointing out that the presumption, unless rebutted,
established the intent to intimidate, when the actual intent might have
been to cause anger or resentment rather than to intimidate. That
difference might be important, because while a cross burning at a
political rally may arouse "a sense of anger or hatred among the vast
majority of citizens"194 who witness the act, "this sense of anger or
hatred is not sufficient to ban all cross burnings."1 95
The plurality's suggestion that the sense of anger or hatred does
not suffice to ban all cross burnings is ambiguous. The suggestion
may be that the sense of anger and hatred suffices to justify banning
some (but not all) cross burnings using a fighting words approach or,
instead, that arousing such emotions can rarely, if ever, justify such
bans. Consider the R.A.V concurrence's rejection of the Minnesota
Supreme Court's claim that "St. Paul may constitutionally prohibit
expression that 'by its very utterance' causes 'anger, alarm or
188. Id. at 365 ("a burning cross is not always intended to intimidate").
189. Id. at 365-66.
190. Id. at 366 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 402, n. 4 (White, J., concurring) (citing
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445).
19L Id. at 347-48.
192. See id. at 348 (stating that the provision made "the statute unconstitutional in its
current form").
193. Id. at 366.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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resentment,"' because such a construction of the fighting words
exception was overbroad. The concurrence suggested that the "mere
fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or
resentment does not render the expression unprotected"'" because
"such generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip expression of its
constitutional protection."" Presumably, the same might be said
about anger" and would certainly be said about hatred.2 00 Thus, the
fact that a display would cause anger or resentment would not alone
establish that the display could be prohibited under the fighting words
exception.
The criticism being leveled here does not undercut the plurality's
point that a presumption of intimidation might mask the difference
between causing the victim to become angry and causing the victim to
become intimidated, although a separate issue involves how difficult
it is to overcome the employed presumption.201 Rather, the criticism
here is that the plurality seems to commit the very mistake that it
criticizes, namely, adopting a position that also masks the difference
between intending to cause the victim to become intimidated and
intending to cause the victim to become angry.
When noting that cross burning at a political rally is almost
certainly protected2" and affirming the Virginia Supreme Court's
holding that Black's conviction could not pass constitutional muster,2
196. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (quoting Welfare of RAY., 464 N.W.2d at 510).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 308 (1940), the Court noted that
although the defendant had caused those listening to be "incensed," that which was heard
was not "likely to produce violence in others."
200. Petal Nevella Modeste, Race Hate Speech: The Pervasive Badge of Slavery that
Mocks the Thirteenth Amendment, 44 HOw. L.J. 311, 335 (2001) ("The Court has replaced
and amended the Chaplinsky fighting words test to such an extent that words which are
obviously meant to incite hatred are no longer deemed 'valueless' and outside of First
Amendment protections.").
201. Compare Black, 538 U.S. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("presentation of evidence that a defendant burned a cross in public view is
automatically sufficient, on its own, to support an inference that the defendant intended to
intimidate only until the defendant comes forward with some evidence in rebuttal") with
id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("As I see the likely
significance of the evidence provision, its primary effect is to skew jury deliberations
toward conviction in cases where the evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively weak
and arguably consistent with a solely ideological reason for burning.").
202. Id. at 366 (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 402).
203. Id. at 367.
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the Court refused to consider two different political rallies: (1) a
political rally that took place in a particular area precisely because it
was likely to cause anger and resentment, and (2) a political rally that
took place in a particular area precisely because it would threaten or
intimidate the onlookers. Thus, the Court refused to address directly
whether a political rally staged as a mode of intimidating particular
individuals or groups would nonetheless be protected. Yet, by
holding that Black's conviction could not stand, rather than
remanding the case to find out whether the rally had been staged to
intimidate those who might witness it, the plurality suggested that he
could not be prosecuted even if he led a political rally that involved a
cross burning with the intent to intimidate individuals who would no
doubt see the fiery display. Given the plurality's reasoning, one would
have expected a remand to discover whether in fact the intent to
intimidate had been present. The plurality criticized Virginia's
presumption of intent for sweeping too broadly, since it does not
distinguish between a cross burning at a public rally or a cross
burning on a neighbor's lawn. It does not treat the cross burning
directed at an individual differently from the cross burning
directed at a group of like-minded believers. It allows a jury to
treat a cross burning on the property of another with the
owner's acquiescence in the same manner as a cross burning on
the property of another without the owner's permission.204
The plurality's point here is well-taken insofar as the suggestion is
that the law is making an assumption about why a cross would be
burned (to intimidate), even were there no reasonable chance that
anyone would find the display unwelcome. If the display is on
property where the owner consents and is only seen by those who
agree with the message, then the presumption about intimidation is
misplaced. In contrast, when a cross is burned without permission on
someone else's property, then such a presumption is much more
reasonable.
Regrettably, the plurality failed to take its own point to heart.
Even when there is a cross burning with permission of the owner, it
may well be done with the intent to intimidate. Suppose, for
example, that Elliott had burned a cross on his own property with the
intent to intimidate his neighbor, Jubilee. Or, suppose that Elliott
204. Id. at 366.
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had decided to have a political rally on his own land, including a cross
burning, precisely because he wanted to intimidate his neighbor,
Jubilee. That the cross burning occurred on private property with the
owner's blessing would not negate the fact that this had been done
with the intent to intimidate.
In his concurrence and dissent, Justice Souter noted that "the
symbolic act of burning a cross, without more, is consistent with both
intent to intimidate and intent to make an ideological statement free
of any aim to threaten." 5  He explained that "in real-world
prosecutions, there will always be further circumstances, and the
factfinder will always learn something more than the isolated fact of
cross burning."206 Sometimes the circumstances will establish an
intent to intimidate,2 " but at other times the evidence will be
"equivocal," 208 for example, "where a white supremacist group burns a
cross at an initiation ceremony or political rally visible to the
public." 2" Regrettably, Justice Souter seemed focused on what to do
when a group had one intention (to rally the faithful) that might be
misinterpreted as intended to intimidate. He, like the plurality, did
not indicate what should be done when both intentions were present.
Often, individuals who communicate political messages have
more than one intention, for example, they may intend to express
solidarity with like-minded individuals and also to anger, dishearten,
or intimidate individuals who are not like-minded. 210 The Court needs
to explain the First Amendment protections for communications
intended to serve multiple purposes. For example, political
communications might be protected as long as a purpose or, perhaps,
the predominant purpose does not involve intimidation.' Or,
205. Id. at 385 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
208. Id. Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Lee , 6 F.3d 1297, 1303 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Looking at the
evidence in this light, a jury could reasonably find that Lee intended to burn the cross for
the purpose of advocating the use of force or violence and his actions were likely to
produce such action. In addition, the record supports a jury finding that Lee intended to
threaten or create a reasonable fear of violence among the Tamarack residents."). See
also Jessica Silbey, Videotaped Confessions and the Genre of Documentary, 16 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 806 (2006) ("Intentions are complicated, multiple
and conflicting.").
211. Cf Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285 (2004) (discussing the predominant
motivation test for evaluating whether voter districting offends constitutional guarantees).
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political communication might not be protected as long as one of its
purposes is to intimidate,2 12 even if the other purposes are beyond
reproach. Support in the case law might be found for either
approach, and there are important implications depending upon
which is chosen. One is much more speech-protective than the other,
with all of the benefits and drawbacks of protecting more (or less)
speech.
A different but related issue involves what must be shown to
establish that an individual intends to intimidate or threaten someone
else. Lacking much guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts
have been trying to work out some of these issues and, unsurprisingly,
have come up with very different views.
II. What Makes a Threat?
The United States Supreme Court has offered little guidance
with respect to what constitutes a threat that is outside First
Amendment protection. State and lower federal courts have been
trying to make sense of this area of the law, sometimes seeking to
refine what the Court has said and sometimes striking out on their
own. While there is something to be said for permitting lower courts
to work out some of the details of a doctrine, the Court has given so
little direction that courts are offering radically different accounts of
what the Constitution requires. The Court must bring some
consistency to a currently chaotic jurisprudence.
A. What is a True Threat?
Courts agree generally about how to define a true threat,
although there are some matters in dispute. True threats involve
"words which are voluntarily and intentionally uttered which avow a
present or future determination to inflict physical injury on an
individual or individuals."213 A true threat "must convey a serious or
genuine threat, and must be distinguished from idle, careless talk,
exaggeration, jests, or political hyperbole." 214  There is no
requirement that the "person threatened was even aware that the
212. See Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (discussing "[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally
proscribable sense of the word").
213. People v. Prisinzano, 648 N.Y.S.2d 267,275 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1996).
214. Id. at 275-76 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
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threat had been made, so long as the threat was uttered or otherwise
communicated to another person."215
An alleged threat could be communicated to one individual, a
small group, or a mass audience. For example, in United States v.
Kelner,216 the Second Circuit reviewed a conviction of an individual
who on a news show communicated his intention to assassinate
Yasser Arafat.217 The court rejected Kelner's claim that his comments
could not be construed as a threat because they were disseminated to
such a wide audience, noting that publishing a "threat in 100 major
newspapers, even though it would reach only an 'indefinite and
unknown audience,' would be as sure a means of communicating the
threat to the victim as would calling him on the telephone." 218
Often, threats are made to secure some further objective, for
example, to gain political advantage,219 to convince individuals to stop
performing abortions,220 to grant a student a requested schedule
211
change,2 or to get someone else in trouble.222 A separate question,
however, is whether a statement will only be construed as a true
threat if the possible infliction of harm is somehow linked to attaining
some further goal.
In United States v. Alkhabaz,223 the Sixth Circuit construed an
important federal statute to say that "a communication objectively
indicating a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm
cannot constitute a threat unless the communication is also conveyed
215. Id. at 276 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
216. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2.d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976).
217. See id. at 1022.
218. Id. at 1023.
219. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing Kelner,
534 F.2d 1020 ((2d Cir. 1976)).
220. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Dr. Crist, Ms.
Brous, and other members of Planned Parenthood's staff testified that Mrs. Dinwiddie's
conduct has caused them to fear for their personal safety. Dr. Crist stated that because of
his fear of the defendant, he now wears a bullet-proof vest. Planned Parenthood has
responded to Mrs. Dinwiddie by placing an armed guard at its front door.").
221. Lovell By and Through Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("[T]here is no question that any person could reasonably consider the
statement 'If you don't give me this schedule change, I'm going to shoot you,' made by an
angry teenager, to be a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.").
222. United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing woman who, in
retaliation for two boys having reported the criminal acts of her son, tried to make it
appear that the boys had threatened numerous people).
223. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
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for the purpose of furthering some goal through the use of
intimidation." 224  That interpretation was rather surprising-the
federal statute at issue read: "Whoever transmits in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to
kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both."225 The statute did not include a further requirement that the
threat be made in furtherance of some objective, although such
threats would also be covered by the statute.
At issue in Alkhabaz were a series of emails involving "sexual
interest in violence against women and girls." 226 In addition, the
accused had posted stories on the internet involving the "abduction,
rape, torture, mutilation, and murder of women and young girls,"22
including one story involving the rape, torture, and murder of a
woman who had the same name as one of the defendant's college
classmates.228
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the communications at issue did
not constitute true threats because even "if a reasonable person
would take the communications between Baker and Gonda as serious
expressions of an intention to inflict bodily harm, no reasonable
person would perceive such communications as being conveyed to
effect some change or achieve some goal through intimidation."22 9 On
the contrary, the court noted that the individuals sought to forge a
bond based on their common sexual fantasies.230
In dissent, Judge Krupansky argued that the intention to
intimidate or coerce was "irrelevant."231 Instead, he argued that the
"pertinent inquiry is whether a jury could find that a reasonable
recipient of the communication would objectively tend to believe that
the speaker was serious about his stated intention."2 32 Admittedly,
224. Id. at 1495.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
226. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1493.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1496.
230. Id. ("Baker and Gonda apparently sent e-mail messages to each other in an
attempt to foster a friendship based on shared sexual fantasies.").
231. Id. at 1504 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146,
148-50 (6th Cir. 1992)).
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the "stated intention" in this kind of case is somewhat different from
someone's reporting what he will do when he gets out of prison.
Here, it is simply unclear whether these fantasies involving
kidnapping, rape, and torture should be construed as a stated
intention rather than as some kind of fiction, although it is true that
stories might reasonably be construed as threats depending upon the
contexts and, in any event, a trier of fact might find that these were
not mere fantasies.
The disagreement dividing the Sixth Circuit illustrates some of
the confusing aspects of the true threat jurisprudence. While the
paradigmatic true threat is easy to identify, e.g., a serious statement
that physical violence will be visited upon someone unless she acts in
a way desired by the person making the threat, other kinds of
statements are more difficult to classify. The contents of the emails at
issue in Alkhabaz would be terrifying to someone who might be the
victim," although the emails were not sent to frighten or intimidate
and were welcomed by those exchanging them.2" The defendant in
Alkhabaz had suggested that his communications were protected by
the First Amendment. 237  The Sixth Circuit did not reach the
constitutional question, instead holding that the communications at
issue were not the sort of communications that Congress had
233. See, e.g., United States v. Parr, 545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008) (involving an
individual's telling his cellmate about plans to blow up a federal building after his release
from prison).
234. See, e.g., In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 741 (Wis. 2001) ("[W]hile we believe
that Douglas's story is crude and repugnant, we nonetheless must reject the State's
argument. To be sure, Mrs. C testified that Douglas's story frightened her. Further,
Douglas conveyed his message directly to Mrs. C, the alleged victim of the threat.
However, there is no evidence that Douglas had threatened Mrs. C in the past or that Mrs.
C believed Douglas had a propensity to engage in violence... . Had Douglas penned the
same story in a math class, for example, where such a tale likely would be grossly outside
the scope of his assigned work, we would have a different case before us. But in the
context of a creative writing class, Douglas's story does not amount to a true threat.").
235. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497-1501 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 1496.
237. Id. at 1493 ("[T]he district court dismissed the indictment against Baker,
reasoning that the e-mail messages sent and received by Baker and Gonda did not
constitute 'true threats' under the First Amendment and, as such, were protected speech.
The government argues that the district court erred in dismissing the indictment because
the communications between Gonda and Baker do constitute 'true threats' and, as such,
do not implicate First Amendment free speech protections. In response, Baker urges this
Court to adopt the reasoning of the district court and affirm the dismissal of the
indictment against him.").
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intended to criminalize," although there is reason to think that
Congress's intent was more inclusive than the majority implied.29
The majority was correct that the Interstate Communications
Act 24 focused on express threats to kidnap or injure rather than on
fantasies involving kidnap victims. However, the dissent was
correct2A that Congress nowhere suggested that an additional element
of the crime was that the message recipient "would perceive such
expression as being communicated to effect some change or achieve
some goal through intimidation (the actus reus)." 242 Consider, for
example, one individual who confides to another in an email that she
plans to kidnap or injure some third party. Such a comment might
not have been made to intimidate anyone and, indeed, might have
made with the expectation that the recipient would heartily approve
of the proposed attack.243
The Sixth Circuit recognized that threats are prohibited, in part,
because "of the fear caused by the threat, the disruption engendered
by such fear, and the possibility that the threat of violence will
occur." 244 Yet, reports to third parties of impending violence might
produce fear and disruption and, in any event, the threatened action
might be carried out. Thus, the cited rationales would not support the
construction offered by the Sixth Circuit.
238. Id. at 1496 (quoting DeAndino, 958 F.2d at 147) ("Ultimately, the indictment
against Baker fails to "'set forth ... all the elements necessary to constitute the offense
intended to be punished' and must be dismissed as a matter of law.").
239. See id. at 1501-02 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) ("The words in section 875(c) are
simple, clear, concise, and unambiguous. The plain, expressed statutory language
commands only that the alleged communication must contain any threat to kidnap or
physically injure any person, made for any reason or no reason. Section 875(c) by its terms
does not confine the scope of criminalized communications to those directed to identified
individuals and intended to effect some particular change or goal.").
240. See 18 U.S.C. § 875 (2006).
241. See Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1502 (Krupansky, J., dissenting) (discussing "the
majority's extra-legislative graft upon specific Congressional language").
242. Id. at 1495 (majority opinion).
243. Cf In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Wis. 2001) (discussing a student's threat to
hurt individuals other than those to whom the threat was communicated). In A.S.,
however, one of the recipients of the information found the oral communication quite
frightening, and repeatedly asked the communicator to stop making the threats. See id. at
724.
244. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1496 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388). For a discussion of
some of these costs, see Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True Threats, and the First
Amendment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 541, 547-50 (2004) (discussing the possible costs to the
victims, their families, and the taxpayers).
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In United States v. Twine,245 the Ninth Circuit also interpreted the
provision of the Interstate Communications Act and suggested that
Congress required that specific rather than general intent be
established as an element of the crime. The Twine court reasoned
that "the level of culpability must exceed a mere transgression of an
objective standard of acceptable behavior (e.g., negligence,
recklessness)."2" Because of this higher threshold, a diminished
capacity defense to the statute could be maintained.247 For example, if
the individual "lacked the capacity to entertain the intent necessary to
commit these offenses,"2 4 then he could not be found guilty, even if
his comments might have been construed to be a threat.
In United States v. DeAndino,249 the Sixth Circuit explained the
difference between specific and general intent:
The issue in the present case is whether the second element-
"the communication containing a threat"-requires general
intent or specific intent. If the statute contains a general intent
requirement in regard to the threat element of the offense, the
standard used to determine whether or not the communication
contained an actual threat is an objective standard, i.e., would a
reasonable person consider the statement to be a threat. If the
statute contains a specific intent requirement, the standard is a
subjective standard, i.e., did the particular defendant have the
subjective knowledge that his statement constituted a threat to
injure and did he subjectively intend the statement to be a
threat.2 o
The DeAndino court rejected the Twine analysis requiring specific
intent, because even if a "statute containing the word 'threat' has only
a general intent requirement, the prosecution must still prove that the
threat is a 'real threat' as opposed to a mistake or inadvertant [sic]
statement."251 Regrettably, the Sixth Circuit does not seem to have
appreciated the difficulty that the Ninth Circuit pointed out.
245. United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1988).
246. Id. at 680.
247. See id. at 679 ("Twine's defense at trial was that he could not have violated 18
U.S.C. §§ 875(c) and 876 because he lacked the capacity to entertain the intent necessary
to commit these offenses.").
248. Id.
249. United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1992).
250. Id. at 148.
251. Id. at 149.
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Suppose that an individual purposely and voluntarily says
something in jest but is reasonably interpreted by someone else to be
making a threat. The Twine approach would not classify the
statement as a threat, whereas the DeAndino approach would,
because the subjective intent to make a threat was lacking, even
though a reasonable listener might have construed the statement as a
threat.
The Supreme Court has thus far avoided this issue. Consider
Watts, where the Court suggested that no reasonable person could
have interpreted Watts's comments as a genuine threat against the
President.252 But this meant that the Court simply did not need to
address whether a statement intended as a jest but reasonably
interpreted by others as a threat could be considered a threat for
constitutional or statutory purposes.253
Other circuits have not embraced the Ninth Circuit's
construction of the Interstate Communications Act. For example, in
United States v. Fulmer, the First Circuit held that a violation of the
Act could be established as long as a reasonable person would have
interpreted the relevant communication as a threat, even if it had not
been so intended by the individual making the statement.2 Yet, even
those circuits agreeing that only general intent is required, do not
agree about how to spell out what that requirement involves. 255 The
focus of their disagreement is on "the appropriate vantage point."'
Basically, the fear is that focusing on the perspective of the
(reasonable) person making the statement might yield different
252. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
253. It might be noted that the Twine court distinguished between the kind of intent
that had to be established when a threat against the President was at issue and the kind of
intent that which had to be established when threats against others were at issue. See
Twine, 853 F.2d at 681 (citing Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969))
("Because of the distinction drawn in Roy, between the President and private citizens, it is
clear that the general intent to threaten required by § 871 is not sufficient for a conviction
under §§ 875(c) and 876. These latter sections, concerned with private citizens and other
public officials, logically require a showing of a subjective, specific intent to threaten.");
but see United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490-91 (1st Cir. 1997) (refusing to
distinguish among these statutes with respect to the kind of intent required).
254. See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491.
255. See Paul T. Crane, Note, 'True Threats' and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV.
1225, 1244-48 (2006) (discussing some of the different versions of the reasonableness
standard).
256. Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491.
[Vol. 38:2374 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Winter 20111 BRANDENBURG AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
results than would focusing on the perspective of the (reasonable)
hearer.257
The First Circuit offered the following test-"the appropriate
standard under which a defendant may be convicted for making a
threat is whether he should have reasonably foreseen that the
statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it
is made." 258 This standard was viewed as preferable, because it "not
only takes into account the factual context in which the statement was
made, but also better avoids the perils that inhere in the 'reasonable-
recipient standard,' namely that the jury will consider the unique
sensitivity of the recipient." 259 The Fulmer court wanted to avoid the
possibility of conviction using a hearer-based standard-"were we to
apply a standard guided from the perspective of the recipient, a
defendant may be convicted for making an ambiguous statement that
the recipient may find threatening because of events not within the
knowledge of the defendant." 260 By the same token, when construing
the general intent standard, the Ninth Circuit has described the test as
"whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault." 261
It is simply unclear whether the difference between the
perceptions of the reasonable statement maker and those of the
reasonable recipient would yield a different result in many cases.
Presumably, in many instances, both a reasonable statement maker
and a reasonable listener would understand that a particular
statement might be construed as a threat, even if there were good
reason to believe that it was not intended to be one.262
257. See id. (distinguishing between "what a person making the statement should have
reasonably foreseen or what a reasonable person receiving the statement would believe").
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990).
262. See Doe v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 623 (8th Cir. 2002)
("The debate over the approaches appears to us to be largely academic because in the vast
majority of cases the outcome will be the same under both tests. The result will differ only
in the extremely rare case when a recipient suffers from some unique sensitivity and that
sensitivity is unknown to the speaker. Absent such a situation, a reasonably foreseeable
response from the recipient and an actual reasonable response must, theoretically, be one
and the same.").
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A different issue splitting the circuits is whether the U.S.
Constitution requires that an individual who is accused of making a
threat must have wanted that statement to be understood as a threat
in order for her statement to lose its First Amendment protections.
The resolution of this debate might be thought to have important
implications for the true threat jurisprudence in particular and for
First Amendment jurisprudence more generally.263
B. What Intent Requirement Is Constitutionally Mandated?
Recently, several circuits have examined Black to help determine
what kind of intent is constitutionally required for a finding of a true
threat. As is perhaps unsurprising, the circuits have split, some
reading Black to provide more robust protections for those accused of
having made a true threat. In United States v. Cassel,264 the Ninth
Circuit offered its interpretation of Black, writing:
The Court laid great weight on the intent requirement. It
offered this definition of unprotected "true threats" and
"intimidation": "True threats" encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need
not actually intend to carry out the threat .... Intimidation in
the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of
true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of
265bodily harm or death.
The Cassel court commented: "The clear import of this definition is
that only intentional threats are criminally punishable consistently
with the First Amendment,"2 i.e., "speech may be deemed
unprotected by the First Amendment as a 'true threat' only upon
proof that the speaker subjectively intended the speech as a threat."2 6'
263. But see infra, notes 290-93 and accompanying text (suggesting that this difference
may not be so important as a practical matter in many cases).
264. United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005).
265. Id. at 631 (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003)).
266. Id.
267. Id. at 633. See also Roger C. Hartley, Cross Burning-Hate Speech as Free Speech:
A Comment on Virginia v. Black, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004) ("Moreover, Black
deserves commendation for its implicit reaffirmation of the speech-protective principle
that even when speech can be regulated because it creates a substantial evil such as
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:2376
Winter 20111 BRANDENBURG AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
As further support for its reading of Black, the Ninth Circuit
explained that the
Court's insistence on intent to threaten as the sine qua non of a
constitutionally punishable threat is especially clear from its
ultimate holding that the Virginia statute was unconstitutional
precisely because the element of intent was effectively
eliminated by the statute's provision rendering any burning of a
cross on the property of another "prima facie evidence of an
intent to intimidate.'
While correct that one provision of the Virginia statute was
unconstitutional precisely because of its treatment of intent,269 the
Cassel court failed to focus on the Black plurality's silence with
respect to the constitutionally required test to determine intent.
Because the Virginia presumption obviated the need to establish
either subjective or objective intent, one simply cannot tell whether
the statute would have passed muster if it had included a reasonable
person standard for determining whether the cross burner had an
intent to intimidate. Further, while the Cassel court offered a
possible reading of the Black plurality opinion, other readings were
not only possible but more plausible. For example, when saying,
"'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,"270
the Black Court cited to Watts. But the previous jurisprudence,
including Watts and Rogers,271' has been interpreted to merely require
that the individual (1) meant to communicate, i.e., is acting
272
voluntarily and understands what he is saying, (2) a serious
intimidation, the state may not suppress it merely because it has that tendency. The
speaker must intend that result.").
268. Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631.
269. See supra, notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
270. Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
271. See supra, notes 24-70 and accompanying text.
272. See United States v. Ogren, 52 M.J. 528, 535 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) ("If the
speaker intended to make the statement, knew what the words meant, and reasonably
should have foreseen that the statements he made would be understood as indicating a
serious intention to commit the act, then this element is satisfied."); Pulaski Cnty. Special
Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d at 624 ("[T]he speaker must have intentionally or knowingly
communicated the statement in question to someone before he or she may be punished or
disciplined for it."). See also Crane, supra note 255, at 1235-36 ("All objective tests
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expression, i.e., is neither a jest nor political hyperbole,273 (3) with an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence, where that intent would
be determined in light of what a reasonable person aware of the
274circumstances would interpret the statement to mean.
The Court's discussion of intimidation as one type of true threat
was not meant to exclude true threats that were not directed at the
victim. Otherwise the Court would not have cited to Watts in the
previous sentence, which involved an alleged threat against the
President that certainly was not made to President Johnson directly
and may well have never been communicated to him. By the same
token, the alleged threat made by Rogers was not communicated
directly to President Nixon and may well never have been
communicated to him.
Cassel's holding has not gone unnoticed. In United States v.
White,275 a federal district court in Virginia wrote,
This Court recognizes the potential for a conflict between the
Supreme Court's definition of a true threat and an objective
analysis of a true threat. At least two Circuit Courts of Appeal
have seized upon this potential conflict, and resolved it by
concluding that the Supreme Court's definition of a true threat
in Black precludes an objective analysis.276
The White court cited Cassel and a decision,277 United States v.
Magleby,2 78 in which the Tenth Circuit noted:
require one general intent element-the defendant must have knowingly made the
statement. Therefore, the government must prove that the 'statement was not the result
of mistake, duress, or coercion.' For example, 'a foreigner, ignorant of the English
language, repeating these same words without knowledge of their meaning, may not
knowingly have made a threat.' Similarly, if the speaker involuntarily made the statement,
it would not pass the objective test.") (internal citations omitted).
273. See United States v. Pinkston, 338 F. App'x 801, 802 (11th Cir. 2009) ("A true
threat is a serious threat and not words uttered as mere political argument, idle talk, or
jest."). See also Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 ("We do not believe that the kind of political
hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term.").
274. See Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d at 624 ("J.M. intended to
communicate the letter and is therefore accountable if a reasonable recipient would have
viewed the letter as a threat.").
275. United States v. White, No. 7:08-CR-00054, 2010 WL 438088 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4,
2010).
276. Id. at *8.
277. Id. at *8 n.6.
278. United States v. Magleby, 420 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Unprotected by the Constitution are threats that communicate
the speaker's intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
against identifiable individuals. The threat must be made "with
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death."2 79
While the White court's reading of Cassel was correct, its reading of
the Tenth Circuit opinion is much less firmly grounded. For example,
the Tenth Circuit did not discuss in this passage whether to use an
objective or subjective test to determine the intent of the actor, so this
does not establish that the Tenth Circuit agrees with the Ninth.
Indeed, while the Seventh Circuit reads Magleby as adopting the
subjective test,' the Tenth Circuit itself has since made clear that it
interprets Black to be consistent with an objective intention test."
The White court rejected the suggestion that Black required a
subjective test, both because the Fourth Circuit has used an objective
test even after Black,' and because use of the subjective test would
be less effective in promoting some of the purposes behind
criminalizing true threats, e.g., preventing the disruption of lives and
the fear of harm.8  Finally, the White court further noted that "there
is 'nothing in the Black opinion to indicate that the Supreme Court
279. Id. at 1139 (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 359).
280. See Parr, 545 F.3d at 499 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Magleby, 420 F.3d at 1139).
281. See United States v. Wolff, 370 F. App'x 888, 892 (10th Cir. 2010) ("The question
is whether those who hear or read the threat reasonably consider that an actual threat has
been made. It is the making of the threat and not the intention to carry out the threat that
violates the law.' The trier of fact, therefore, must decide whether a 'reasonable person
would find that a threat existed." (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations
omitted)).
282. See United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009) ("Statements
constitute a 'true threat' if 'an ordinary reasonable recipient who is familiar with the[ir]
context . . . would interpret [those statements] as a threat of injury."'). See also United
States v. Napa, 370 F. App'x 402, 404 (4th Cir. 2010) ("The communication must be
viewed using an objective standard, that is, whether 'an ordinary, reasonable person who is
familiar with the context of the communication would interpret it as a threat of injury."').
Napa was issued March 19, 2010, over a month after White, which had been issued on Feb
4, 2010.
283. White, 2010 WL 438088, at *8 ("If the prohibition on true threats is meant to
protect listeners from the 'fear of violence' and the corresponding 'disruption that fear
engenders,' then the subjective intent of the speaker cannot be of paramount
importance.").
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intended to overrule a majority of the circuits by adopting a
subjective test when dealing with true threats."84
A different decision mentioned by the White court should be
mentioned. In United States v. Parr,"' the Seventh Circuit offered its
own true threat analysis in light of Black. The court noted,
Traditionally, the law in this and most other circuits has
[applied] ... an objective "reasonable person" test. . ., an
inquiry that asks whether a reasonable speaker would
understand that his statement would be interpreted as a threat
(the "reasonable speaker" test) or alternatively, whether a
reasonable listener would interpret the statement as a threat
(the objective "reasonable listener" or "reasonable recipient"
test).286
While admitting the possibility that the "Court was not attempting a
comprehensive redefinition of true threats in Black,"8' the Parr court
suggested that it was "more likely, however, that an entirely objective
definition is no longer tenable.""' Two possibilities were offered.
Either the Court was rejecting the objective approach 289 or was now
advocating a new approach adopting both subjective and objective
elements-"the factfinder might be asked first to determine whether
a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would interpret the
speaker's statement as a threat, and second, whether the speaker
intended it as a threat. In other words, the statement at issue must
objectively be a threat and subjectively be intended as such." 290
In many cases, it would not be difficult to establish that a true
threat had been made even if both the subjective and objective tests
were used. When someone says that he plans to blow up a federal
building,291 a jury might well find that the requisite subjective and
284. Id. (citing United States v. D'Amario, 461 F. Supp. 2d 298, 302 (D.N.J. 2006)).
285. See generally Parr, 545 F.3d 491.
286. Id. at 499 (citing United States v. Stewart, 411 F.3d 825, 827-28 (7th Cir. 2005)).
287. Id. at 500.
288. Id. (citing Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631-33).
289. Id. (suggesting that the Court may have wanted to "retire the objective
'reasonable person' approach").
290. Id.
291. See id. at 495.
[Vol. 38:2380 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Winter 20111 BRANDENBURG AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
objective intent to commit a violent act.2" Indeed, in many of these
cases, when someone asserts what might reasonably be construed as a
threat and cannot credibly claim that he was merely playing a
practical joke or, perhaps, did not understand what he was saying, it
would be unsurprising for a jury to find that the intent prong,
however defined, has been met.
Certainly, it is possible that a factfinder would say both that a
reasonable person would interpret a particular statement in light of
the circumstances as a threat and that the defendant credibly
established that he had not intended to make a threat. Yet, the mere
possibility that a jury would so find does not provide much protection
in addition to what is afforded under the objective intent approach.
Even where subjective intent must be established, a factfinder might
not believe the defendant's statements regarding his having had no
intention to make a threat,293 and might even reject testimony that the
defendant could not form the requisite intent.2 94
The circuit courts have had numerous disagreements when trying
to figure out what kinds of representations qualify as true threats.
Most of these disagreements have focused on the proper test for
intent. Yet, even with the most restrictive intent requirement-such
as the Parr requirement which says that "the statement at issue must
objectively be a threat and subjectively be intended as such,"2 95 there
will be many cases in which arguably political speech falls into the
true threat exception. Perhaps that is a desirable result but, if so, that
result should be recognized and defended.
As is illustrated by the burning cross cases, no words need to be
expressed in order for a jury to find that a true threat has been
292. See id. at 500 ("Parr put his intent at issue, and the jury was instructed to evaluate
Parr's statements for their objective meaning and Parr's subjective intent.").
293. Id. at 496 ("Parr testified and admitted making the statements (he could hardly do
otherwise) but claimed he had been joking-just mouthing off to his cellmate."); id. at 497
("The jury was properly instructed that Parr's statements qualified as a true threat if a
reasonable person would understand that the statements, in their context and under all the
circumstances, would be interpreted as 'a serious expression of an intention to use a
weapon of mass destruction to damage the Reuss Federal Plaza.' The jury was also
instructed that it must be satisfied that Parr 'intended his statement[s] to be understood in
that manner."'); id. at 496 ("The jury convicted Parr .... ").
294. Cf Twine, 853 F.2d at 682 ("[W]e find that the district judge considered and was
unpersuaded by Twine's diminished capacity defense.").
295. Parr, 545 F.3d at 500.
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made.296 Consider an individual who parks two Ryder trucks outside
of an abortion clinic,297 not long after the Oklahoma City bombing
involving a Ryder truck occurred.298 While there might be testimony
suggesting that the defendant knew that the Ryder trucks would be
perceived as a bomb threat,299 such testimony might well not be
required, especially if no non-threat-related reasons are offered to
explain why the trucks had been left there.o
True threats can be distinguished from fighting words or
advocacy of illegal conduct in that there is no required showing of
imminence where true threats are concerned.301 Further, there is no
required showing that the threat can or will be carried out,302 since
many of the harms associated with true threats will occur as long as
the victim believes that the threat is real.0 3
296. See, e.g., Lee, 6 F.3d at 1297 (Gibson, J., concurring) ("Bruce Roy Lee was
convicted of conspiracy against civil rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1988), after he
constructed and burned a cross on a hill near an apartment complex in which a number of
black families resided.").
297. See United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000).
298. Id. at 1069-70 ("On the morning of September 25, 1997, employees arriving at the
clinics were alarmed by the presence of the trucks. Reminded of the catastrophic 1995
bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, involving a Ryder
truck, employees of the clinics feared that the trucks contained bombs. They immediately
left the buildings and notified the police. At each clinic, the area was evacuated, and a
bomb squad was called in to investigate. The authorities determined, however, that the
trucks contained no explosive materials.").
299. Id. at 1070 ("Based on conversations with his son, Hart's father concluded that
Hart acted with the intent that 'if people believed that there was a bomb on one or more
of those Ryder trucks, that it would have been worth it in order to save at least the life of
one baby."').
300. See id. at 1072 ("Hart offered no legitimate reason for leaving the trucks early that
morning, and he provided no notice or explanation for his actions. These circumstances,
coupled with the similarity to the well-known events of the Oklahoma City bombing, were
reasonably interpreted by clinic staff and police officers as a threat to injure.").
301. See, e.g., United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 154 (3th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hile
advocating violence that is not imminent and unlikely to occur is protected, speech that
constitutes a 'true threat' is not."); State v. DeLoreto, 827 A.2d 671, 682 (Conn. 2003)
("[T]he threat need not be imminent to constitute a constitutionally punishable true
threat."); Parr, 545 F.3d at 497 (7th Cir. 2008) ("It is true that Parr gave no precise time
for carrying out his plan and did not relay his threats directly to his intended victim. But
neither point is dispositive. A threat doesn't need to . . . specify when it will be carried
out.").
302. Parr, 545 F.3d at 498 ("It is well-established that the government is not required
to prove that the defendant in a threat case intended or was able to carry out his threats.").
303. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (discussing "the reasons why threats of violence are
outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the
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That true threats are offered less protection than other kinds of
expression is important. For example, the same statement might be
constitutionally protected if construed as advocacy but subject to
criminal penalty if construed as a threat. But such differential
treatment can only be defensible if there is some clear way to
distinguish between the two kinds of expression.
Regrettably, in many cases, there is no clear dividing line
between advocacy and threats. It will not do to say, for example, that
threats must be directed at specific individuals,3"" because true threats
can be made against groups."0o While it might be claimed that there is
a clear difference between one's advocating that others perform a
particular (violent) task and one's threatening to perform that very
task oneself,30" such a distinction may not be helpful when interpreting
a website posting.
Consider a website containing photographs of doctors who
perform abortions. Suppose that in addition to the fact that the
doctors' names and addresses are listed,'' and the physicians are
described as "Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity. """ This would be
terrifying to anyone whose picture was posted there, especially if
other targeted doctors had recently been murdered.3" Nonetheless, it
is not all clear whether to say that the website is advocating illegal
conduct or, instead, threatening it.3"' Indeed, insofar as the posting is
understood to be suggesting that people use legal means to try to
convince these doctors to stop performing abortions, it would not be
disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will
occur)").
304. See Elrod, supra note 244, at 543.
305. Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (describing a "true threat, where a speaker directs a threat
to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm
or death").
306. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hile advocating violence is protected, threatening
a person with violence is not.").
307. See id. at 1064-65.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 1066.
310. See id. at 1091 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("In order for the statement to be a
threat, it must send the message that the speakers themselves-or individuals acting in
concert with them-will engage in physical violence. The majority's own definition of true
threat makes this clear. Yet the opinion points to no evidence that defendants who
prepared the posters would have been understood by a reasonable listener as saying that
they will cause the harm.") (emphasis added).
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either advocating or threatening illegal action,31' although it is of
course true that a reasonable person might not view the posting as
*312quite so benign.
Consider the language that was characterized as advocacy in
Claiborne Hardware, e.g., "If we catch any of you going in any of
them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck."' 3" Facially,
the language would seem to a threat because it is an assertion about
what we will do. But if this is advocacy rather than a threat, then
there must be something distinguishing advocacy from threats that
does not involve whether the speaker is in control of the threatened
action.314 Regrettably, the Court has offered no guidance on this
matter, leaving the lower courts to guess whether there is some
implicit distinction to be discovered and, if so, what that distinction
might be.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has made clear that advocacy of illegal
conduct including violence is protected under the Constitution unless
the Brandenburg factors have been met. The Court has also made
311. Cf id. at 1090 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("[T]he two posters and the web page, by
their explicit terms, foreswore the use of violence and advocated lawful means of
persuading plaintiffs to stop performing abortions or punishing them for continuing to do
so."). The mere posting of personal information does not alone suffice to establish a true
threat. Cf Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, No. 4:09-cv-373/RS-WCS, 2010 WL 1740832,
*3 (N.D. Fla. April 30, 2010) ("Merely publishing an officer's address and phone number,
even with intent to intimidate, is not a 'true threat' as defined in constitutional law
jurisprudence."). This might be especially true if the posting of information could be
justified by a legitimate reason. See United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1267,
1272, 1286 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (discussing website seeking information about agents and
informants and noting that although the website might appear threatening, "Carmichael
has offered a legitimate use for his site, to solicit evidence regarding his case").
312. See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1090 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) ("Nevertheless, because context matters, the statements could reasonably
be interpreted as an effort to intimidate plaintiffs into ceasing their abortion-related
activities.").
313. Id. at 1094 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
314. Cf Matthew G. T. Martin, True Threats, Militant Activists, and the First
Amendment, 82 N.C. L. REV. 280, 314 (2003) ("The second element of a true threat is
evidence that the speaker, or one controlled by the speaker, intends to carry out the
threat. This requirement operates to narrow the subset of proscribable threats resulting
from the objective test discussed immediately above."). See also Jennifer E. Rothman,
Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 289 (2001)
(discussing "an actor prong which requires proof that the speaker explicitly or implicitly
suggest that he or his co-conspirators will be the ones to carry out the threat").
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clear that while advocacy is protected, threatening speech is not. Yet,
the Court has not offered ways to distinguish the two and, further,
sometimes characterizes as advocacy what might reasonably, in
addition or instead, have been characterized as a threat. To make
matters even more confusing, many of the harms caused by threats,
e.g., to the potential victim's feelings of security and well-being, might
also be caused by advocacy. For example, the abortion-providers
whose names and addresses were posted on the internet were not
worried that those posting the information would come after them,
but worried instead that unknown abortion-protesters might target
them." But this suggests that distinguishing between advocacy and
threats in this kind of case does not make sense. Indeed, one wonders
what the defendants could have done to assure that their posting
would be treated as advocacy rather than as a threat.
Perhaps the Court believes that anything that could reasonably
be characterized as a physical threat should not be protected. Such a
position would not be particular speech-protective but would at least
be understandable. Yet, that is not what the Court has said. By
characterizing speech in various cases as advocacy or hyperbole even
though the speech could have been construed differently, the Court is
seeking to protect some threatening speech. Indeed, by refusing to
consider whether one of the cross burnings in Black had been
intended to intimidate, the Court sent confusing and contradictory
signals. One cannot tell from Black whether certain core political
speech is protected even if reasonably construed as threatening or if,
instead, core political speech is protected only when it is not
threatening.
People often have more than one intention when they express
themselves, and the Court's pretending otherwise does a disservice to
all. It may well be that certain types of political messages are
threatening and should nonetheless be protected. But if that is so,
then the Court should offer some way to distinguish between those
kinds of threats that should nonetheless be protected and those that
should not. Otherwise, lower courts will continue to reach radically
different results in relevantly similar cases based on arbitrary
315. See Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc., 290 F.3d at 1091 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) ("Plaintiffs themselves explained that the fear they felt came, not from
defendants, but from being singled out for attention by abortion protesters across the
country.").
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characterizations of speech that might reasonably be construed in any
number of ways.
The current jurisprudence does not offer adequate protection for
arguably political speech, and at the same time sometimes immunizes
speech reasonably perceived as intimidating or threatening. Lower
courts are not only given too little useful guidance, but are also
offered distinctions and characterizations that cannot withstand
scrutiny and can only serve to confuse.
In our increasingly contentious society, it will become even more
important to establish what kinds of expression are protected and
what kinds are not. The current Brandenburg/true threat
jurisprudence must not only be clarified, but must be put on a
different path that recognizes the legitimate competing interests that
are implicated in these kinds of speech and that attempts to chart a
course adequately accounting for all of these interests. The Court's
almost willful refusal to address or even see the issues helps no one
and almost guarantees a chaotic jurisprudence where relevantly
similar cases are decided dissimilarly. The Court can and must do
better.
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